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How to Identify Cause and Effect in Rand’s Ethics

By Roger E. Bissell

November 10, 2021

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Editor’s Note:   Many critics of Roger Bissell’s first essay in this series are staunch admirers of Rand. But their critique seemed to miss a vital point. Bissell elevates Rand by arguing that flourishing is front and center in her ethics, and that she has made a novel non-predatory egoism one of the key derivatives of flourishing. Here, Bissell argues how to locate cause and effect in Rand’s ethics.

 

Indeed, there is a visible separation—a seven-page gap between the argument for man’s life as standard of value and commitment to one’s own life, on the one hand, and for egoism, a.k.a. rational selfishness, and self-as-beneficiary, on the other.

If, as I have argued in “Perfecting Ayn Rand’s Egoism: Setting the Record Straight,” egoism or rational selfishness is not the essence of Rand’s ethics, then just how does it logically or conceptually fit into her ethics? If egoism is derivative and secondary, as Rand claims, then it must somehow be derived from her basically eudaimonistic morality—that is, it must be a separately argued-for point. Indeed, there is a visible separation—a seven-page gap between the argument for man’s life as standard of value and commitment to one’s own life, on the one hand, and for egoism, a.k.a. rational selfishness, and self-as-beneficiary, on the other. It certainly appears that two distinct arguments are being made, with a considerable amount of other material between them, including especially a lengthy polemical discussion of the fallacy of hedonism.

Granted, one cannot coherently hold man’s life as the standard and logically arrive at a rejection of rational selfishness as one’s conclusion; but this simply means that given the truth of man’s life as the standard, rational selfishness can’t be false. It doesn’t necessarily mean that they are tightly welded together. Were they actually axiom-and-corollary, one might reasonably wonder why Rand saw fit to separate them and delay the big announcement of rational selfishness by interposing her critique of hedonism. Unless…egoism actually is a corollary of eudaimonism or man’s life as the standard—that is, a corollary, just not the (i.e., the only) corollary. Are there any other candidates in Rand’s essay for corollaries of eudaimonism? Yes. During the two pages preceding her endorsement of rational selfishness, Rand makes a vigorous case against hedonism, which has often traditionally been conflated with and distortive of egoism (certainly, of the rational variety); and her case against hedonism rests strongly upon the same premise as her subsequent endorsement of egoism (that is, of “rational selfishness”)—namely, man’s life as the standard of value.14

Indeed, another term for hedonism might be emotionalistic selfishness. It’s  interesting to note, in this connection, what may be the original formulation of Rand’s anti-hedonist critique. In a journal entry dated 28 May 1955, Rand states that a result of placing “emotions above mind” is that a person:

makes emotions part of his thinking process in the specific role of a judge of values and, later, almost the judge of truth and facts (or the meaning of facts) and, therefore, the judge of certainty in any given thought process. While to a rational man the answer to a problem is a factual identification or explanation of reality—to a sub-basement emotionalist the answer to a problem is the achievement of a happy or positive emotion.

Rand’s critique of hedonism (and emotionalism) thus helps to reveal yet another facet of egoism not being an ethical primary. As Rand notes, hedonism elevates happiness to the standard (rather than the purpose) of ethics, and this, she says, is reversing cause and effect. Happiness follows from doing what is in your rational self-interest, whereas pursuing what (you think) makes you happy may in fact not be in your rational self-interest. Instead, it may undercut both your rational self-interest and your long-term happiness.

As Rand notes, hedonism elevates happiness to the standard (rather than the purpose) of ethics, and this, she says, is reversing cause and effect.

Similarly, benefits to yourself follow from doing what is in your rational self-interest, whereas if you treat benefits-to-self as your basic guideline in ethics, you again may actually be undercutting your rational self-interest and your long-term well-being. Paraphrasing Rand’s discussion of hedonism:

…the relationship of cause to effect cannot be reversed. It is only by accepting “man’s life” as one’s primary and by pursuing the rational values it requires that one can obtain benefits—not by taking “benefit” as some undefined, irreducible primary and then attempting to live by its guidance. If you achieve that which is the good by a rational standard of value, it will necessarily result in benefits for you; but that which results in benefits for you, by some undefined emotional standard, is not  necessarily the good. To take “whatever gives one benefits” as a guide to action means: to be guided by nothing but one’s emotional whims.16

Thus, either self-benefit or happiness applied as a primary and as a standard for one’s choices and actions would be just such a self-destructive reversal of cause and effect. Instead, they are properly viewed as consequences of and derivative from the standard of man’s life. In an early journal entry, dated 14 April 1946, Rand makes a particularly eloquent statement of this principle in the context of economics (and of the pernicious effects of the doctrines of altruism and collectivism), but which clearly has far wider application and particularly to the present discussion:

To preserve the effect, one must preserve the cause; to have a river, one must keep free and open the “fountainhead,” the source which produces  the water. If one attempts to manage the cause by the rules applicable only to the effect (and actually not applicable [even to the effect]), one stops the cause. If one uses the water in the river as the spring gives it, one has both river and spring. If one attempts to regulate the spring by rules derived from considerations of the river without thought of its source, one loses both spring and river. Another example of the collectivist-altruist reversal of cause and effect, of the primary and the secondary.17

Rand underscored this point in regard to happiness and hedonism in “The Objectivist Ethics,” and three years later she made the  same point explicitly in regard to beneficiary and egoism. Unfortunately, this latter material was in the introduction to her book and it preceded the cause-effect-reversal discussion, so it was not properly connected to it for the benefit of readers. Thus, Rand’s failure to make even a modest revision to her capstone essay, “The Objectivist Ethics,” in order to nail down this vital parallel, is perhaps a major reason why it is not more widely understood to this day that rational egoism is not fundamental to the Objectivist ethics.

It is now clear that rational egoism (rational selfishness) is the second of two corollaries of man’s life as the standard of moral value. This is further confirmed by a point made by Rand in her discussion of hedonism and happiness: “The maintenance of life and the pursuit of happiness are not two separate issues.”18 Rand could equally well have said the maintenance of life and the acquiring of things beneficial to oneself are not two separate issues.

True, you can’t have anti-hedonism or rational egoism without man’s life as the standard, and you can’t reverse them causally with it. However, you can conceptually distinguish them and note the fact that anti-hedonism and rational egoism follow immediately from man’s life as the moral standard. Thus, although (as Rand says) there is one “issue,” there are two “arguments.” Even an immediate inference—in this case, from man’s life as the standard to either anti-hedonism or rational egoism—is still an additional argument.

There is one final point to make about anti-hedonism and rational selfishness (or anti-conventional egoism) as corollaries and derivative truths in relation to man’s life as the moral standard. Although neither of them can be substituted for man’s life as the standard without illogical and potentially disastrous existential results, this does not mean that they are unimportant or a matter of indifference. Indeed, they are consequences of one’s acting in accordance with life as the standard. Instead, it just means that they are non-primaries and thus that we cannot use them in place of the requirements of man’s life as one’s standard of value. Since they are necessary consequences of acting in accord with that standard, however, their absence is an indicator that something is wrong, that in some way or other one has failed to act in accord with man’s life as the standard.

This is why neither a right answer in math, nor happiness or personal benefit in life is an infallible guide to knowing that you’re on the road to success—and why you should always check your work (and your premises)!

Just as getting the right answer on a math problem does not necessarily mean that you worked it correctly, being happy or obtaining a benefit does not necessarily mean that you acted according to man’s life as the standard. However, working a problem correctly will result in the correct answer, and acting according to man’s life as the standard will result in your happiness and will be to your personal benefit. This is why neither a right answer in math, nor happiness or personal benefit in life is an infallible guide to knowing that you’re on the road to success—and why you should always check your work (and your premises)!

The end does not justify the means. You have to get there the right way!

Another helpful metaphor is sports, where it’s frequently important not only  to know where you’re going, but also how you’re getting there—that is, to keep your eye not only on the end (the goal), but also on the means (the ball). The end does not justify the means. You have to get there the right way! Acting from a desire for points or happiness or self-benefit is entirely rational and appropriate—they are what you want in a game or in life—but only if they are more fully understood as necessary conditions for your well-being as a successful game-player or rational being, for your flourishing, your best, fullest life as a whole, as an individual.

Thus, neither hedonism nor even rational selfishness is a proper measuring stick for a successful life. Instead, rational individualistic perfectionism is your proper guide for becoming the best individual you can, for becoming the best, most rational player of the game, whether a sports game or the game of life—and then, in keeping with cause and effect, letting the points and happiness and benefits happen as they may (and will).

 
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Notes and References

  1. This interpretation of the close relationship between Rand’s cases against hedonism and for rational selfishness is supported by Darryl Wright, “Reasoning About Ends: Life as a Value in Ayn Rand’s Ethics,” in Gotthelf and Lennox, ibid., p. 25 n. 18.
  2. David Harriman, ed. Journals of Ayn Rand. (New York: Dutton, 1997), p. 670, emphasis original.
  3. Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism (New York: Signet, 1964), p. 32.
  4. Harriman, ibid., p. 424; bracketed phrase inserted by Harriman.
  5. Rand, ibid., p. 32.

 

 

This essay (presented in two parts) is an abridged and revised version of the paper titled “Eudaimon in the Rough: Perfecting Rand’s Egoism” published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, December 2020, and appears here with the permission of Pennsylvania State University Press.

 

 

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